Abstract. This paper presents simulation-based relations for probabilistic game structures. The first relation is called probabilistic alternating simulation, and the second called probabilistic alternating forward simulation, following the naming convention of Segala and Lynch. We study these relations with respect to the preservation of properties specified in probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic.
Introduction
Simulation relations [Mil89] have proved to be useful for comparing the behavior of concurrent systems, which can be formally interpreted as labeled transition systems. The study of logic characterization of simulation is to build its connection to a modal or temporal logic which can be used to formulate some interesting properties. Soundness of logic characterization requires simulation preserve the satisfaction of logic formulas, while completeness shows the relation has the same strength as the logic. Intuitively, the fact that one state s 1 simulates another state s 2 can be used to establish the relation that any possible behavior of s 1 is also possible on s 2 . Thus it can preserve certain desirable properties 1 formulated in temporal logics like CTL [Eme90] . Simulation relations have set up the foundations for constructing correct abstractions.
Related work. Segala and Lynch [SL95] extend the classical notions of simulation for probabilistic automata [Seg95b] , a general extension of labeled transition systems which admits both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviors. Their main idea is to relate probability distributions over states, instead of relating individual states. They show soundness of the logical characterization of probabilistic simulation, which preserves probabilistic CTL formulas [Han94] without negation and existential quantification. Segala introduces the notion of probabilistic forward simulation, which relates states to probability distributions over states and is sound and complete for trace distribution precongruence [Seg95a, LSV07] . Logic characterization of strong and weak probabilistic bisimulation has been studied in [DGJP02, PS07] .
Alur, Henzinger and Kupferman [AHK97, AHK02] define ATL (alternatingtime temporal logic) to generalize CTL for game structures by requiring each path quantifier to be parametrized with a set of agents. Game structures are more general than LTS, in the sense that they allow both collaborative and adversarial behaviors of individual agents in a system, and ATL can be used to express properties like "a set of agents can enforce a specific outcome of the system". Alternating refinement relations, in particular alternating simulation, are introduced later in [AHKV98] . Alternating simulation is a natural gametheoretic interpretation of the classical simulation in two-player games. Logic characterization of this simulation concentrates on a subset of ATL formulas where negations are only allowed at proposition level and all path quantifiers are parametrized by a prefixed set of agents A. This sublogic of ATL contains all formulas expressing the properties the agents in A can enforce no matter what the other agents do. Alur et al. [AHKV98] have proved both soundness and completeness of the logic characterization.
Our contribution. In this apper, we introduce two notions of simulation for probabilistic game structures -probabilistic alternating simulation and forward simulation, following the aforementioned results [Seg95a, SL95, AHKV98] . We prove the soundness of logical characterization of probabilistic alternating simulation relations, by showing that they preserve a fragment of a probabilistic extension of ATL.
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We briefly explain some basic notations that are used throughout the paper in Sect. 2. Sect. 3 introduces the notion of probabilistic game structures and the definition of probabilistic executions. In Sect. 4 we present PATL an extension of the alternating-time temporal logic [AHK02] for probabilistic systems, and roughly discuss its model checking problem. We define probabilistic alternating simulation and forward simulation in Sect. 5, and show their soundness for preserving properties specified in PATL in Sect. 6. Probabilistic alternating bisimulation is shortly discussed in Sect. 7. We conclude the paper with some future research topics in Sect. 8.
Preliminaries
This section contains basic notions that are used in the technical part. Let S be a set. A discrete probabilistic distribution ∆ over S is a function of type S → [0, 1], satisfying s∈S ∆(s) = 1. We write D(S) for the set of all such distributions. For a set S ⊆ S, define ∆(S ) = s∈S ∆(s). Given two distributions
Obviously, ∆ 1 ⊕ p ∆ 2 is also a distribution. We further extend this notion by combining a set of distributions {∆ i } i∈I ordered by an indexed set {p i } i∈I into a distribution i∈I p i ∆ i , where p i ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ I and i∈I p i = 1. s is called a point distribution satisfying s(s) = 1 and s(t) = 0 for all t = s. Let ∆ ∈ D(S), write ∆ for the support of ∆ as the set {s ∈ S | ∆(s) > 0}.
A play ρ is a (finite or infinite) sequence s 0 a 1 s 1 a 2 s 2 . . ., such that a i ∈ Act and δ(s i−1 , a i )(s i ) > 0 for all i. Write |ρ| for the length of a run ρ, which is the number of transitions in ρ, and |ρ| = ∞ if ρ is infinite. We write ρ(i) for the i-th state in ρ starting from 0, and ρ[i, j] for the subsequence starting from i-th state and ending at the j-th state, provided 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ |ρ|. Note that the players choose their next moves simultaneously, but their moves may or may not be cooperative. If on state s each player i performs action a i , then δ(s, a 1 , a 2 , . . . a k ) is the distribution for the next reachable states. In the following discussion, we fix a probabilistic game structure G.
We assume that the transition relation is total on the set Act. Note that this does not pose any limitation on the expressiveness of the model. If an action c ∈ Act i of player i is not supposed to be enabled on state s for player i, we may find another action c ∈ Act i and define c to have the same effect as c on s. Since player i knows the current state, he also knows the set of actions available to him, so that as a rational player he will not choose actions that are not enabled. This allows such models to express systems in which on some states the available (joint) actions are proper subsets of Act.
2 We may even disable a particular player on a state. A player i is disabled on s if δ(s, a) = δ(s, a ) for all action vectors a, a ∈ Act satisfying a(j) = a (j) for all j = i. A PGS is turnbased if all but one player is disabled on s for all s ∈ S. A probabilistic game structure can be regarded as a generalization of a concurrent game structure of [AHK02] . From a state s ∈ S, each player i may choose an action from Act i and together they resolve the nondeterminism. On the other hand, a PGS is more stratified on external actions than some of the existing models. In the literature some authors encode available actions for player i as a function of type S → 2 Act i \ {∅}. 3 For example, a one-player PGS resembles a reactive system of [vGSS95] , and a twoplayer turn-based PGS (assuming they alternately act) loosely simulates a simple probabilistic automaton [Seg95b] , in the way that one player performs external actions and the other resolves nondeterminism after the previous player's move is done.
A strategy of a player i ∈ Σ is a function of type S + → D(Act i ). We write Π G i for the set of strategies of player i in G.
4 A play ρ is compatible with an i-strategy
for all k ≤ |ρ| and i = 1, . . . , k. Write G(π, s) for the set of infinite plays compatible with every strategy in π starting from s ∈ S, and G * (π, s) the set of finite plays in G that are compatible with π starting from s. The set of finite plays compatible to a strategy vector π is also called a set of cones [Seg95b] , with each finite play α representing the set of infinite plays prefixed by α. Given a state s 0 ∈ S, we can derive the probability for every member in S + compatible with π, by recursively defining a function P r G(π,s0) from S + to [0, 1] as follows. This function P r G(π,s0) can be further generalized as the probability measure to the σ-field F G,π,s0 ⊆ G(π, s 0 ) which is a unique extension from the set of cones G * (π, s) closed by countable union and complementation, in a way similar to [Seg95b] :
where δ(s, ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , . . . , ∆ k ) is a distribution over states derived from δ and the vector of action distributions defined by
Given A ⊆ Σ, sometimes we write π(A) for a vector of |A| strategies {π i } i∈A , and Π(A) for the set of all such strategy vectors. Write A for Σ \ A. Given A ∩ A = ∅, strategy vectors π ∈ Π(A) and π ∈ Π(A ), π ∪ π is the vector of strategies {π i } i∈A ∪ {π j } j∈A that combines π and π .
We also define strategies of finite depth by restricting the size of their domains, by writing π ∈ Π G,n i as a level-n strategy, i.e., π is a function from traces of states with length up to n (i.e., the set m∈{1,2,...,n} S m ) to D(Act i ). Given a set of strategies {π i } i∈I of the same domain, and {p i } i∈I with i∈I p i = 1, let π = i∈I p i · π i be a (combined) strategy, by letting π(γ) = i∈I p i · π i (γ) for all γ in the domain.
We overload the function δ as from a state in S and a vector of strategies (of any depth n) π ∈ Π
Probabilistic Executions
We settle the nondeterminism in a probabilistic game structure by fixing the behaviours of all players represented as strategies. Let G = S, s 0 , L, Act, δ be a PGS, define a probabilistic execution E as in the form of E, ∆, L E , δ E , where -E ⊆ S + is the set of finite plays starting form a state in the initial distribution and compatible with δ E , i.e., s 0 s 1 . . . s n ∈ E if s 0 ∈ ∆ , and
is a (deterministic) transition relation, satisfying for all e ∈ E there exists a (level 1) strategy vector π e , such that δ E (e)(e · t) = δ(last(e), π e )(t) if t ∈ δ(last(e), π e ) , and 0 otherwise.
A probabilistic execution of G can be uniquely determined by a strategy vector π starting from a state distribution. Given
for all e ∈ E π , and δ π (e) = δ(last(e), π e ) for all e ∈ E π , where π e (i) = π(i)(e) for all i ∈ Σ. Intuitively, a probabilistic execution resembles the notion of the same name proposed by Segala and Lynch [Seg95b, SL95] , and in this case the strategies of the players altogether represent a single adversary of Segala and Lynch.
Probabilistic Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
In this section we introduce a probabilistic version of alternating-time temporal logic [AHK02] , which focuses on the players ability to enforce a property with an expected probability. Let Prop be a nonempty set of propositions. Probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic (PATL) formulas [CL07] are defined as follows.
where A ⊆ Σ is a set of players, ∈ {<, >, ≤, ≥}, k ∈ N ∪ {∞}, p ∈ Prop, and α ∈ [0, 1]. We also write ψ 1 U ψ 2 for ψ 1 U ≤∞ ψ 2 as 'unbounded until'. The symbols φ, φ 1 , φ 2 are state formulas, and ψ is a path formula. We omit the syntactic sugars in our definition, such as true ≡ p ∨ ¬p and false ≡ p ∧ ¬p for some p ∈ Prop, φ 1 ∨ φ 2 ≡ ¬(¬φ 1 ∧ ¬φ 2 ) for state formulas. The path modality R can be expressed by U without introducing negations into path formulas, as we will show later in this section. One may also define 2 ≤k ψ ≡ false R ≤k ψ, and 3 ≤k ψ ≡ true U ≤k ψ, where k ∈ N ∪ {∞}. The set of PATL formulas L are the set of state formulas as defined above. We have the semantics of the path formulas and the state formulas defined as follows.
α ψ iff there exists a vector of strategies π ∈ Π(A), such that for all vectors of strategies π ∈ Π(A) for players in A, we have P r
where ρ is an infinite play in G, α ∈ [0, 1], φ, φ 1 , φ 2 are state formulas, and ψ is a path formula. Equivalently, given S the state space of a probabilistic game structure G, we write φ for {s ∈ S | s |= φ} for all PATL (state) formulas φ. For ∆ ∈ D(S), we write ∆ |= φ iff ∆ ⊆ φ . Intuitively, G, s |= A ≥α ψ describes the ability of players in A to cooperatively enforce ψ with probability at least α in s.
The following lemma is directly from the PATL semantics. If a group of users A can enforce a linear-time temporal logic formula ψ to hold with probability at least α with strategies π ∈ Π(A), then at the same time π enforces the formula ¬ψ to hold with probability at most 1 − α. To simplify the notation, we let '∼' denote changes on directions of the symbols in {<, >, ≤, ≥}, e.g., symbol ≥ for ≤, ≤ for ≥, > for <, and < for >.
Proof. (sketch) For all π ∈ Π(A) and π ∈ Π(A), s ∈ S and ψ a path formula,
Therefore, the path quantifier R (release) can be expressed by the existing PATL syntax, in the way that
, where both ¬φ 1 and ¬φ 2 are state formulas.
On Model Checking of PATL
In this section we briefly survey the results in the literature related to PATL model checking. Given a PATL formula in the form of A α ψ(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ), regarding φ 1 , . . . , φ n as the sets of states satisfying state formulas φ 1 , . . . , φ n , a standard way to solve this problem is to determine the maximal or minimal probability that the players in A can enforce the LTL formula ψ(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ). In the following we write ψ for ψ(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) without further confusions.
LTL properties are special cases of ω-regular winning objectives [Tho91] in two-player concurrent (zero-sum) games [dAM04, CdAH06] . In such games one may group a set of players A ⊆ Σ into a single protagonist and A into a single antagonist. Given an ω-regular winning objective ξ and starting from a state Fig. 1 . An example showing that player I can guarantee to satisfy 3φ with probability α for all 0 ≤ α < 1, but he cannot ensure that property with probability 1.
s ∈ S, the protagonist plays with a strategy trying to maximize the probability for a play to satisfy ξ while the antagonist tries to minimize the probability. In such a game there always exists a unique value in [0, 1], on which both players have strategies to guarantee (or infinitely approach) their best performances, regardless of the strategies played by their opponents. Such a supremum value (or infinum value, as for the antagonist) is called the value of the game [Mar98, dAM04] . In a probabilistic multi-player game, we let a group of players A ⊆ Σ be a single player, and A be the other, and the supremal probability for A to enforce such an LTL formula ψ starting from a given state s ∈ S can be uniquely determined. This value is defined as
Example 1. Fig. 1 gives a PGS with two players {I, II}, initial state s 0 , Act I = {a 1 , a 2 } and Act II = {b 1 , b 2 }. Note that this PGS is deterministic, i.e, no probabilities in its transitions. We assume that the only available transitions from s 1 and s 2 are self-loops, and the other transition relations are as depicted in the graph. Suppose player I wants to maximize the probability to enforce the property 3φ, and player II aims to minimize it.
Since the strategies applied on s 1 and s 2 do not matter, we focus on the choices of actions from both players on s 0 . We first focus on memoryless strategies, and let player I's strategy π 1 gives π 1 (γ)(a 1 ) = p and π 1 (γ)(a 2 ) = 1 − p for all γ ∈ S + . Similarly we let II assign probability q to b 1 and 1 − q to b 2 all the time. This produces an infinite tree, on which we write x s0 (I) for the actual probability I can achieve 3φ from s 0 , given the above memoryless strategies. (Note that x s1 (I) = 0 and x s2 (I) = 1 in all cases.) This establishes an equation which further derives x s0 (I) =
. A simple analysis shows that when p approaches 1, the minimal value of x s0 (I) approaches 1 as well, for all choices of q. That is, there exists a strategy for player I to enforce 3φ with probability 1 − ε for all ε > 0. However, if player I chooses p = 1, player II may set q = 0 so that a play will be trapped in s 0 for ever that yields x s0 (I) = 0. The result of [dAM04] shows that in this case player I cannot do better even with general (history dependent) strategies. In fact there are no strategies for player I to enforce 3φ with probability 1.
Indeed, A ψ(s) can be almost the best, i.e., we have G, s |= A ≥ A ψ(s)−ε ψ for all ε > 0 [dAHK98] . Nevertheless, the quantitative version of determinacy [Mar98] ensures that for all LTL formulas ψ and s ∈ S, we have
The PATL model checking problems can be solved by calculating the values A ψ s (s) for each state s, where each local objective ψ s related to s might be distinct. The algorithms of [dAM04] define monotonic functions of type (S → [0, 1]) → (S → [0, 1]) to arbitrarily approach a vector { A ψ s (s)} s∈S in a game structure with finite state space S with respect to an ω-regular winning objective ψ. Within each step one has to go through O(|S|) matrix games, and each iteration produces a unique fixed point. The algorithms on safety and reachability objectives are special cases of solving stochastic games [RF91] . More complex properties can be expressed as nested fixed points [dAM04] . Therefore, the upper bound complexities become exponential to the size of the winning objectives translated from LTL formulas. More recently, alternative algorithms proposed in [CdAH06] prove that for quantitative games with ω-regular winning objectives expressed as parity conditions, whether the values of a game is within [r − , r + ] can be decided in N P ∩ coN P for all rational r ∈ [0, 1] and > 0, which improves the theoretical upper bound for estimating the optimal values.
Optimal Strategies
It has been shown in [dAM04] that for safety games there always exist optimal strategies for the protagonists, however for reachability games it is not always the case. As shown in example 1, player I has no optimal strategy to enforce 3φ with probability 1 on s 0 even though I φ(s 0 ) = 1. Based on similar proof strategies applied in [dAM04] , we examine the existence of optimal strategies on winning objectives expressed as path formulas of PATL on a state.
Lemma 2. Let s be a state, ψ be a path formula, and A the set of protagonists.
1. If ψ is of the form φ, φ 1 U ≤k φ 2 , φ 1 R ≤k φ 2 , or φ 1 Rφ 2 with k ∈ N, there always exists a joint optimal strategy for A that enforces ψ on s with probability at least A ψ(s). 2. If ψ is of the form φ 1 Uφ 2 , there always exists a joint -optimal strategy for A that enforces ψ on s with probability at least A ψ(s) − , for all > 0.
For the prove of Lemma 2 we rely on the representation of a solution for a winning objective in quantitative game µ-calculus [dAM04] . For the sake of readability we leave the whole proof in the appendix. The next result proves the existence of a joint A strategy to enforce an PATL path formula with probability greater than α if there exists a joint strategy to enforce that formula with probability greater than α against an optimal A strategy.
Lemma 3. Let ψ be a PATL path formula and π be a joint optimal strategy for the antagonists A on state s, if there exists a joint strategy π for the protagonists
Proof. Since π is the optimal strategy for the antagonists, we have for all joint strategies π , P r G(π ∪π ,s) ({ρ ∈ G(π ∪ π , s) | ρ |= ψ}) ≤ A ψ(s), then we have A ψ(s) > α. If there exists an optimal joint strategy for A then we have s |= A ≥ A ψ(s) ψ, which implies s |= A >α ψ. Otherwise by Lemma 2 there exists an -optimal joint strategy for A with small > 0 to enforce ψ with probability at least A ψ(s) − > α. This also gives us s |= A >α ψ.
This result does not hold if we replace the operator ">" by "≥" for unbounded until U. This is because if there does not exist a joint optimal strategy for A to enforce φ 1 Uφ 2 with probability ≥ α, we have no space to insert a tiny > 0 as we did in the above proof. For the fragment of path formulas without unbounded until, we extend the results for ≥, by the fact that optimal joint strategies for A always exist for these path modalities, as shown by Lemma 2.
Lemma 4. For path formulas ψ in the form of φ or φ 1 U ≤k φ 2 and optimal strategies π for the antagonists A on state s, if there exists a joint strategy π for the protagonists A such that P r G(π∪π ,s) ({ρ ∈ G(π ∪ π , s) | ρ |= ψ}) α, then G, s |= A α ψ, where k ∈ N and ∈ {>, ≥}.
Proof. Since there exists joint strategies for A against A's optimal strategies, we have A ¬ψ(s) 1 − α, therefore A ψ(s) α by determinacy. By Lemma 2 there always exist optimal strategies for A to enforce ψ with probability α if ψ is in the form of φ or φ 1 U ≤k φ 2 .
A-PATL
We define a sublogic of PATL by focusing on a particular set of players. Similar to the approach of [AHKV98], we only allow negations to appear on the level of propositions. Let A ⊆ Σ, an A-PATL formula φ is a state formula defined as follows:
where k ∈ N, ∈ {>, ≥} and A ⊆ A. Write L A for the set of A-PATL formulas. An A-PATL formula describes a property that players in A are able to ensure with a minimal expectation by their joint strategies. Note that we only allow '> α' in the construction of unbounded until.
Probabilistic Alternating Simulation Relations
We define probabilistic versions of alternating simulation [AHKV98] . An alternating simulation is a two-step simulation. For a sketch, suppose state s is simulated by state t. In the first step the protagonists choose their actions on t to simulate the behaviour of the protagonists on s, and in the second step the antagonists choose actions on s to respond the behaviour of the antagonists on t.
This somehow results in a simulation-like relation, so that for a certain property the protagonists can enforce on s, they can also enforce it on t. To this end we split Σ into two groups of players -one group of protagonist and the other group of antagonist. Subsequently, we consider only the two-player case in a probabilistic game structure -player I for the protagonist and player II for the antagonist, since what we can achieve in the two-player case naturally extends to a result in systems with two complementary sets of players, i.e., A ∪ A = Σ. For readability we also write the transition functions as δ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) and δ(s, π 1 , π 2 ) for δ(s, a 1 , a 2 ) and δ(s, π 1 , π 2 ), respectively. Let S, T be two sets and R ⊆ S × T be a relation, then R ⊆ D(S) × D(T ) is defined by ∆RΘ if there exists a weight function w : S × T → [0, 1] satisfying -t∈T w(s, t) = ∆(s) for all s ∈ S, -s∈S w(s, t) = Θ(t) for all t ∈ T , -sR t for all s ∈ S and t ∈ T with w(s, t) > 0.
Note in this definition, it is equivalent to have t∈ Θ w(s, t) = ∆(s) for all s ∈ S, and s∈ ∆ w(s, t) = Θ(t) for all t ∈ T . Since w can only assign non-zero values to the states in the support of ∆ or Θ. If w(s, t) > 0 for some s ∈ ∆ and t ∈ T , then we would have t∈T w(s, t) > 0 = ∆(s), which is a contradiction. The followings are several properties of lifted relations. 
Proof. We prove the second part, and the first part is similar. Let ∆ = i∈I p i ·
To show that ∆ i R∆ i , we define a weight function w i : S × S → [0, 1] by for all s ∈ S and s ∈ S , w i (s, s ) = w(s, s ) ·
∆ (s ) . Consider the following conditions.
1. w i (s, s ) > 0 implies w(s, s ) > 0, therefore sRs . 2. For all s ∈ S, we have s ∈S w i (s, s ) = s ∈S w(s, s ) ·
3. For all s ∈ S , we have
Lemma 7. Let R be a relation on S and {p i } i∈I be an index set satisfying
Proof. W.l.o.g., let ∆ i ∈ D(S) and ∆ i ∈ D(S ) for all i, and let w i be the weight function for ∆ i R∆ i . Define a new weight function w : S × S → [0, 1], by w(s, s ) = i∈I p i · w i (s, s ).
-w(s, s ) > 0, then i∈I p i · w i (s, s ) > 0, i.e, there exists some i ∈ I such that w i (s, s ) > 0, which gives sRs .
Based on the notion of lifting, we define the probabilistic alternating simulation relation for player I that extends the alternating simulation relation of [AHKV98] . The definition for player II can be made in a similar way. Definition 1. Consider G, G as two probabilistic game structures. A probabilistic alternating I-simulation ⊆ S × S is a relation satisfying if s s , then
Let R ⊆ S × S and R ⊆ S × S be two relations, then R · R is a relation on S × S defined by s(R · R ) s if there exists s ∈ S such that sRs and s R s . such that for all π 3 ∈ Π G ,1 II , there exists π 3 ∈ Π G ,1 II such that δ (s , π 1 , π 3 ) δ (s , π 1 , π 3 ). Then from above there also exists π 1 , π 3 ) . we need to show that ∆ · ∆ .
Let w 1 be a weight function for ∆ ∆ and w 2 a weight function for ∆ ∆ , define a new weight function w :
. Let s ∈ S and s ∈ S .
-If w(s, s ) > 0 then exists s ∈ ∆ such that w 1 (s, s ) > 0 and w 2 (s , s ) > 0, which implies s s and s s . Therefore, s · s .
Lemma 8 can also be derived from the transitivity of probabilistic alternating forward simulation (Corollary 1) and the fact that every probabilistic alternating simulation is also a probabilistic alternating forward simulation (Lemma 11).
Based on the probabilistic forward simulation of Segala [Seg95a] , and the alternating simulation of Alur et al. [AHKV98] , we propose the notion of probabilistic alternating forward simulation. A forward simulation relates a state to a distribution of states, which requires a different way of lifting. Let R ⊆ S ×D(S) be a relation, write R for the smallest relation satisfying ∆RΘ if there exists an index set {p i } i∈I satisfying Σ i∈I p i = 1, such that ∆ = Σ i∈I p i ·s i , Θ = Σ i∈I p i ·Θ i and s i RΘ i for all i. We call R the forward lifting of R. Forward lifting has the following similar properties as the previous lifting.
Lemma 9. Let R be a relation on S×D(S) and {p i } i∈I be an index set satisfying i∈I p i = 1 and ∆ i R∆ i for distributions ∆ i , ∆ i ∈ D(S) for all i, then i∈I p i · ∆ i R i∈I p i · ∆ i , where R is the forward lifting of R.
Lemma 10. Let ∆ ∈ D(S), ∆ ∈ D(S ), and R a relation on S. If ∆R∆ , and there exist ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , · · · ∈ D(S) and an index set {p i } I satisfying i∈I p i = 1 and ∆ = i∈I p i ·∆ i , then there exist ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 · · · ∈ D(S ) such that ∆ = i∈I p i ·∆ i , and ∆ i R∆ i for all i ∈ I, where R is the forward lifting of R. Now we define the probabilistic alternating forward simulation relation for player I, and the definition for player II can be made in a similar way.
Definition 2. Consider two probabilistic game structures G = S, s 0 , L, Act, δ and G = S , s 0 , L , Act , δ . A probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation -for all π 1 ∈ Π G,1
Lemma 11. s t implies s f t.
This lemma says that every probabilistic alternating simulation is a probabilistic forward simulation with a point distribution on the right hand side of the relation. The other way does not hold, i.e., probabilistic alternating forward simulation relates strictly more game structures than probabilistic alternating simulation. In Fig. 2 , we assume Act I and Act II are both singleton sets. One may find that there are no states in the set {s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 } in Fig. 2(b) that can simulate states s 3 and s 5 in Fig. 2(a) . Therefore, we cannot establish a probabilistic alternating simulation from s 1 to s 1 . However, s 1 is related to s 1 by probabilistic alternating forward simulation, since s 3 (s 5 ) can be related to a uniform distribution over s 2 and s 3 (s 4 and s 5 ).
Before proceeding to the next step we introduce the following several auxiliary lemmas.
Proof. Let t ∈ S, then we have
Lemma 13. Let G and G be two game structures, {∆ i } i∈I be a set of distributions, {π i } i∈I a set of level 1 I-strategies, π ∈ Π G ,1 II and {p i } i∈I satisfies
where π is a level 1 I strategy defined by
we need to show for all t ∈ S, LHS(t) = RHS(t). Write ∆ for the distribution
The next result shows that the definition of forward simulation also works on the lifted relation.
Proof. By definition there exists a set {p
II , we prove as follows the existence of another II-strategy
, by Lemma 7. The required (mixed) II-strategy π 1 is defined by π 1 (s) = i∈I p i si(s) ∆(s) π i (s) for all s, and the result follows from Lemma 13.
Consequently, we are able to show that lifted probabilistic alternating forward simulations are transitive. Corollary 1. (Transitivity of alternating forward simulation) Let f be a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation, then ∆ 1 f ∆ 2 and ∆ 2 f ∆ 3 implies ∆ 1 f ∆ 3 .
Forward I-Simulation is Sound for I-PATL
This section establishes the main result of the paper: a relationship between probabilistic forward I-simulation and I-PATL formulas. Recall that a I-PATL formula has only strategy modalities I and ∅ , and negations are only allowed to appear immediately before the propositions. For readability we write I for {I} . Let G and G be two PGSs, ∆ ∈ D(S) and ∆ ∈ D(S ) such that ∆ f ∆ by a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. We need to show that ∆ |= φ implies ∆ |= φ for all I-PATL formula φ. Our proof relies on the existence of player II's optimal strategies for path formulas as winning objectives (as shown in Sect. 4). Suppose π 1 is a I strategy that enforces φ, we construct another I strategy π 1 that simulates π all along the way, in the sense that provided the optimal II strategy π 2 there exists another II strategy π 2 such that the probabilistic execution E(G, π 1 , π 2 , ∆) will be "simulated" by the probabilistic execution E(G , π 1 , π 2 , ∆ ). Since π 1 enforces φ, the E(G, π 1 , π 2 , ∆) satisfies φ, we show that it is also the case of E(G , π 1 , π 2 , ∆ ).
E be probabilistic executions of G and G , respectively. Also let f ⊆ S × D(S ) be a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. We say the pair (E, E ) is an instance of simulation, by writing E E , if there exists a (simulation) relation ⊆ E × D(E ), such that
where last(Θ) is a distribution satisfying last(Θ)(s) = last(e)=s Θ(e). A few properties of the relation are as follows.
A proof of part (1) is by definition of and Lemma 9, and part (2) holds by Lemma 10.
Let ∆ be a state distribution of G, ∆ be a state distribution of G , and ∆ f ∆ . Suppose π 1 is a I strategy in G that enforces φ with probability at least α, and π 2 is a II strategy in G , step-by-step we establish a I strategy π 1 and a II strategy π 2 , so that the probabilistic executution decided by π 1 and π 2 from ∆ will be simulated by the probabilistic executution decided by π 1 and π 2 from ∆ .
Proof. We construct π i 1 and π i 2 as a level 1 strategies of player I and II for all i ∈ N, and define π 1 (γ · s) = π |γ|+1 1 (s) for all γ ∈ S * and s ∈ S. And
(s) for all γ ∈ (S ) * and s ∈ S .
Since ∆ f ∆ , then by Lemma 14, there exists π
2 ) in a similar way. We also 'truncate' the strategy π 1 by defining π 1 (2) ∈ Π G,1 I in the way that π 1 (2)(s) = s ∈ ∆ ∆(s ) · π 1 (s s). And we define π 2 (2) in a similar way.
Suppose we have ∆ n , ∆ n ∈ D(S n ), and π 1 (n) ∈ Π G,1
II , in the similar way to above, we construct π n 1 and π
by π 1 (n + 1)(s) = γ∈ ∆n ∆ n (γ)·π 1 (γ·s), and
It is easily verifiable that we have established two probabilistic executions satisfying E(G, π 1 , π 2 , ∆) E (G , π 1 , π 2 , ∆ ), by taking a probabilistic alternating forward simulation as .
In order to measure the probability of a path formula to be satisfied when the strategies from both player I and player II are fixed, we define a relation |= α for probabilistic executions.
Definition 3. Let G be a probabilistic game structure, E(∆) = E, ∆, L E , δ E a probabilistic execution determined by a strategy vector π E , and ψ a path formula, define
It is conceivable that in a probabilistic execution every finite or infinite trace in E * ∪ E ω maps to a trace in G, in the way that ρ = e 1 e 2 e 3 . . . is a trace in E implies that proj(ρ) = last(e 1 )last(e 2 )last(e 3 ) . . . is a play in G, where the function proj projects every finite sequence of states in E into its last state in S. Consequently, we let P r ∆ E be a probabilistic measure over E ω , such that for the cone sets (of finite traces), we have P r ∆ E (e) = ∆(last(e)), and P r ∆ E (γ · e 1 · e 2 ) = P r ∆ E (γ · e 1 ) · δ E (e 1 )(e 2 ), for γ ∈ E * and e 1 , e 2 ∈ E. Let ρ be an infinite trace in E, we write ρ |= ψ iff proj(ρ) |= ψ. Similarly, for a state formula φ and e ∈ E, write e ∈ φ iff last(e) ∈ φ . In the following we study the properties of the satisfaction relation for a probabilistic execution to satisfy a I-PATL path formula by means of unfolding.
Lemma 17. Let φ, φ 1 and φ 2 be I-PATL (state) formulas, and ∈ {>, ≥} then 1. E(∆) |= α φ iff there exists α α, such that δ E (∆) = ∆ 1 ⊕ α ∆ 2 with ∆ 1 ∩ ∆ 2 = ∅, and ∆ 1 |= φ.
E(∆) |=
α φ 1 U ≤k φ 2 iff there exists a finite sequence of triples { (∆ i,0 , α i,0 ), (∆ i,1 , α i,1 ), (∆ i,2 , α i,2 ) } 0≤i≤j for some j ≤ k, with ∆ i, ∩ ∆ i, = ∅ for all distinct , ∈ {0, 1, 2} and 0 ≤ i ≤ j, such that
3. E(∆) |= α φ 1 U φ 2 iff there exists a finite or infinite sequence of triples
For readability we leave the proof of this lemma in the appendix.
Proof. (sketch) We prove by induction on the structure of a I-PATL formula φ. Base case: suppose ∆ |= p, then s |= p for all s ∈ ∆ . By ∆ f ∆ , there exists an index set {q i } i∈I satisfying i∈I q i = 1, ∆ = i∈I q i s i , ∆ = i∈I q i ∆ i , and s i f ∆ i . Therefore L(s i ) = L (t) for all t ∈ ∆ i . So t |= p for all t ∈ ∆ i for all i. Therefore ∆ |= p. The case of ¬p is similar.
We show the case when φ = I >α φ 1 Uφ 2 , and the proof methods for the other PATL path constructors are just similar. Since for all t ∈ ∆ there exists an optimal strategy π t for the winning objective ¬φ 1 R¬φ 2 by Lemma 2(1), and we combine these strategies into a single strategy π 2 satisfying π 2 (t·α) = π t (t·α) for all t ∈ ∆ and α ∈ S * . Then π 2 is optimal for ¬φ 1 R¬φ 2 on ∆ . Then by
Since π 1 enforces φ 1 Uφ 2 with probability greater than α, we have E(∆) |= >α φ 1 Uφ 2 . Then by Lemma 17(3) there exists a finite or infinite sequence of triples { (∆ i,0 , α i,0 ), (∆ i,1 , α i,1 ), (∆ i,2 , α i,2 ) } 0≤i<j for some j ∈ N + ∪{∞} satisfying the properties as stated in Lemma 17(3). By repetitively applying Lemma 15 we establish another sequence of triples
and ∆ i,1 f ∆ i,1 for all 0 ≤ i < j. By induction hypothesis we have ∆ i,0 |= φ 1 and ∆ i,1 |= φ 2 for all 0 ≤ i < j. Therefore E(∆ ) |= >α φ 1 Uφ 2 by Lemma 17(3). Since π 2 is an optimal strategy of II, we have ∆ |= I >α φ 1 Uφ 2 by Lemma 3. For a formula ∅ α ψ we apply the same proof strategies as for I α ψ, except that player I does not need to enforce ψ with a certain probability α since every probabilistic execution generated by a pair of I and II strategies will enforce ψ with that probability.
Probabilistic Alternating Bisimulation
If a probabilistic alternating simulation is symmetric, we call it a probabilistic alternating bisimulation.
Definition 4. Consider two probabilistic game structures
where is a lifting of by weight functions.
Since every probabilistic alternating I-simulation is also a probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation by treating the right hand side state as a point distribution (Lemma 11), the lifted probabilistic alternating I-simulation is also a lifted probabilistic alternating forward I-simulation. This fact extends for bisimulation. A probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation also preserves formulas in L I . Moreover we write L + I for the set of formulas defined as follows, which allows negations to appear anywhere in a formula, and further we are able to show that probabilistic alternating bisimulation preserves all properties expressed in L
Theorem 2. Let G = S, s 0 , L, Act, δ and G = S , s 0 , L , Act , δ be two PGSs, ⊆ S × S is a probabilistic alternating I-bisimulation. For all s ∈ S and s ∈ S with s s and φ ∈ L + I , we have G, s |= φ iff G , s |= φ.
The proof methodology basically follows that of Theorem 1, besides that whenever ∆ ∆ and ∆ |= ¬φ, we show that if there were s ∈ ∆ such that G , s |= φ then we would also have G, s |= φ for some s ∈ ∆ , which is a contradiction. And from that we have ∆ |= ¬φ as well.
Conclusion and Future Work
We report our first results on probabilistic alternating simulation relations. We have introduced two notions of simulation for probabilistic game structuresprobabilistic alternating simulation and probabilistic alternating forward simulation, following the seminal works of Segala and Lynch [Seg95a, SL95] on probabilistic simulation relations and the work of Alur et al. [AHKV98] on alternating refinement relations for non-probabilistic game structures. Our main effort has been devoted to a logical characterization for probabilistic alternating simulation relations, by showing that they preserve a fragment of PATL formulas. On our way to the main result, we find that the proof strategy accommodated in [AHKV98] no longer applies, due to the failure in reconstructing a strategy from sub-strategies with the existence of probabilistic behaviors. Note that alternating simulations rely on mimicking behaviors by strategies of depth one, while enforcing a PATL property needs to fix a general strategy (of infinite depth) from one party regardless of any strategies of the other. We circumvent this problem by incorporating the results of probabilistic determinacy [Mar98] and the existence of optimal strategies [dAM04] in stochastic games.
There are several ways to proceed. We want to study the completeness of logical characterization for probabilistic alternating forward simulation. It is also of our interest to investigate the complexity for checking probabilistic alternating simulation relations by studying the results in the literature [AHKV98,BEMC00]. Our work was partially motivated by the paper [ASW09] , where PATL is used to formalize a balanced property for a probabilistic contract signing protocol. Here, a balanced protocol means that a dishonest participant never has a strategy to unilaterally determine the outcome of the protocol. It is interesting to see how much the development of simulation relations for probabilistic game structures can help the verification of such kind of security protocols. and II) game. Its grammar is defined as follows.
φ := Q | x | φ 1 ∨ φ 2 | φ 1 ∧ φ 2 | P pre I (φ) | P pre II (φ) | µx.φ | νx.φ
The semantics of such formulas map each formula into F, the function space S → [0, 1]. A member f ∈ F gives an expected value f (s) for player I to win the game on every state s ∈ S. There is a partial order defined on F in the way that given two functions f, g ∈ F, f ≤ g if f (s) ≤ g(s) for all s ∈ S. For Q ⊆ S, it represents a function that Q(s) = 1 if s ∈ Q and Q(s) = 0 otherwise. For conjunction and disjunction, they are defined as (f ∧ g)(s) = min{f (s), g(s)} for all s ∈ S, and (f ∨ g)(s) = max{f (s), g(s)} for all s ∈ S. The quantitative predecessor operator P pre I for player I and for every f ∈ F is by P pre I (f )(s) = π1∈ΠI π2∈ΠII s ∈ δ(s, π1,π2 ) δ(s, π 1 , π 2 )(s )f (s ) for all s ∈ S. The operator P pre II can be defined in a similar way. Intuitively, based on f , P pre i (f ) gives the maximal expectation of player i on each state s after one move, and the existence of such maximal strategy and values are guaranteed by the minimax theorem [vNM47] . Finally, µx.φ(x) = {f ∈ F | φ(f ) ≤ f } and νx.φ(x) = {f ∈ F | φ(f ) ≥ f }.
The existence of the optimal strategy for player I on an LTL objective can be sketched as follows.
-For φ, we construct the optimal strategy from P pre I (φ) by solving a matrix game on each state s ∈ S on reaching states in φ . In this case we only need to construct a level 1 strategy on every state, with its existence guaranteed by the minimax theorem. -For bounded until φ 1 U ≤k φ 2 , we do the following construction recursively and prove the property by induction. φ 1 U ≤0 φ 2 ≡ φ 2 works for every strategy in a state in φ 2 . For k > 0, we interpret φ 1 U ≤k φ 2 as φ 2 ∨ (φ 1 ∧ P pre I (φ 1 U ≤k−1 φ 2 )). Then suppose there exists an optimal strategy for φ 1 U ≤k−1 φ 2 , we only need to prolong the optimal strategy by one additional level, based on the expected value already computed for φ 1 U ≤k−1 φ 2 . -The case of bounded release φ 1 R ≤k φ 2 it can be shown in a similar way as the above case, by letting φ 1 R ≤0 φ 2 as φ 2 , and φ 1 R ≤k φ 2 as φ 2 ∧ (φ 1 ∨ P pre I (φ 1 R ≤k−1 φ 2 )) for each k > 0. -For unbounded release φ 1 Rφ 2 , our argument resembles the proof of [dAM04,  Lemma 2] on safety games. The value of the game for player I as the protagonist is interpreted as the function f = νx.φ 2 ∧(φ 1 ∨P pre I (x)), and there exists a memoryless strategy π 1 ∈ Π G,1 I
for player I so that on each state s ∈ S, π 1 (s) ∈ D(Act I ) is the best choice (in the matrix game on s) player I can make according to the greatest fixed point f , i.e., for all memoryless player II strategies π 2 ∈ Π G,1 II , we have s ∈S δ(s, π 1 , π 2 )(s ) · f (s ) ≥ f (s). We show that π 1 is the strategy that guarantees f (s) on each state s in the general sense. Let π 2 ∈ Π G II be an arbitrary player II strategy, and s ∈ S, we are going to show that in the probabilistic execution E(G, π 1 ∪ π 2 , s) = E, s, L, δ , we have E(s) |= ≥f (s) φ 1 Rφ 2 . In order to do so, we give the following intermediate result that E(s) |= ≥f (s) φ 1 R n φ 2 for all n ∈ N.
We prove this by induction on n ∈ N that E(e) |= ≥f (last(e)) φ 1 R ≤n φ 2 for all e ∈ E. By abuse of the notation we treat π 1 also as a general strategy such that π 1 (γ) = π 1 (last(γ)) for all γ ∈ S + . We also write π
